Divine Hiddenness, Prayer, and Agnosticism

This week I was reading through a book I got for Christmas that I've been wanting to read for quite a while.  It's called "Divine Hiddenness: New Essays."  The problem of divine hiddenness, for those of you not familiar, is simply the question of why God, if he is who Christians say he is, hides from (some of) us.  While divine hiddenness is a very interesting topic, I don't really want to write a lot about divine hiddenness here.

I want to talk about Paul Draper's contribution to the book.  Paul Draper is one of the foremost agnostic philosophers of religion in the United States.  I'll give a really brief summary of his essay, then I'll give a few of my thoughts on the topic.  Draper, as I said, is an agnostic, which is to say he's not sure whether or not God exists.  He thinks there is quite a bit of evidence for both theism and naturalism (which entails atheism).  For those of you curious, here's a quick little list of features of our world that he sees as evidence for each:

Evidence for Theism	Evidence for Naturalism
The universe has a finite past	Earth is not the center of the universe
The existence of intelligent life	The universe is much older than humans
It appears we have free will	Life came about via evolution
It appears we have immaterial minds	Physical processes largely determine mental states
The world is full of beauty	Pain and pleasure are systematically connected to reproduction
Some people have religious experiences	The existence of tragedy in the world
	The distribution of religious experience is very uneven

Now, of course these lists aren't meant to be comprehensive, and I'm sure there are plenty of other things Draper would include if that were his goal, but it isn't.  His point is simply that there is a lot of, at least what seems on the face of it, evidence for both positions.  Further, he says that it's really quite impossible to look objectively at these things and know which evidence is stronger.  One can't simply assign number values for strength to each of the facts about the world, take whichever has the highest number, and believe it.  It's impossible to tell what those strength measurements would be.  So unless one has actually had those religious experiences, there's no good reason to sway one direction over the other.

Draper's conclusion is what I find truly interesting, precisely because it's as intellectually honest as they come.  Draper quotes H.H. Price's abbreviated version of the Agnostic's Prayer: "O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul."  I quote his conclusion at length.  He says:

“Since...I regard God's existence as a real possibility, I whole-heartedly agree with Price that it is reasonable – indeed, I would say rationally required – for me to behave differently than I would if I were an atheist. For example, I ought to pray – unlike the atheist I believe there just might be a God listening. More generally, I ought to do what I can to cultivate or at least prepare for a relationship with God.”

He goes on to say:

“Religious practice is very difficult for an agnostic, and for some there may be value in that difficulty. After all, human beings are psychologically very complex, to say the least. And it is well known that belief is not strongly correlated with sanctification. Thus, if theism is true, then I seriously doubt that the moral and spiritual development of every single human being is best served by belief in this life.”

He concludes with:

“I hope and even believe that my assessment is the result of an open mind rather than a closed or tender heart. But if this is so, then is the ambiguity of the evidence just an unfortunate coincidence? Or is it designed, not by me, but by a God whose policy is, 'Don't find me, I'll call you...when the time is right”? I don't know the answers to these questions. So for now I will sit on the fence, lost perhaps but still looking, leaning perhaps but not leaping, listening I hope, but not yet hearing.”

I have three things I want to discuss with regard to these comments.  One is directed to others who consider themselves agnostic along with Draper, one is directed to atheists, and one is directed to my fellow Christians.  

First, how should agnostics think about this issue?  Well, I can't see how an agnostic would get

around Draper's conclusion here.  Draper isn't sure exactly what probability to assign to God's existence, but he's pretty sure it's not zero.  If it isn't zero, it seems to me that a Pascalian decision calculus would come into play.  It's not exactly Pascal's Wager, since Draper isn't prescribing changes in beliefs or affirming a faith, but the reasoning is similar.  It's really just a piece of intellectual honesty.  Here's what really struck me: it seems like many agnostics use their agnosticism as an excuse to simply not have anything to do with religion.  I consider this variety of agnosticism intellectual laziness.  One presumably is an agnostic because she doubts both God's existence AND his non-existence.  So why do the vast majority of agnostics out there treat their agnosticism as license to act exclusively as if he doesn't exist?  Shouldn't one equally as often act as if she doubts that God does not exist, and thus act in a way similar to the one Draper describes (prayer, preparing for a possible relationship with God, etc.)?

So next is the question of whether or not any of this is relevant to atheists.  Here's my answer: so long as the atheist assigns a non-nil probability to God's existence, she should act in a similar way as Draper.  There are obviously quite a few atheists who do assign a zero probability to God's existence, and this shouldn't affect them at all.  But to give that sort of thing an absolute zero probability is a bit extreme and I'd guess probably fairly rare among atheists.  Here's the thing - if one grants that God's existence is logically possible then his existence is logically necessary.  On Christian theism, God is a necessarily existent being, which is to say that it isn't so much as possible that he not exist.  Another way to put this is to say that God exists is every possible world.  Plantinga's modified version of the ontological argument makes this point quite clearly:

If God's existence is possible, then he must exist in at least one possible world (even if it is not the actual world).  In any possible world in which he exists he is what he is - which is to say that he is a necessary being.  So in any possible world in which he exists it is necessarily false that God does not exist.  But necessary truths and falsehoods are true and false in all possible worlds (i.e. 2+2=4 in every possible world). It must, therefore, be necessarily false in every possible world (which includes the actual one) that God does not exist.  This, of course, means that it is necessarily false in our world that God does not exist, which means that it is necessarily true that God exists in our world.  

If you're an atheist, are you willing to assess a zero probability for God's existence?  If so...kudos - you're very bold.  If not, then shouldn't you at least be putting yourself in the shoes of the agnostic discussed above?

Finally, just what is the Christian to think about all this?  On the one hand, we know that "there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved." (Acts 4:12)  John 3 makes it pretty clear that (a) belief is necessary for salvation and (b) that belief must be placed in Christ.  The story of Lazarus the Beggar (and many other scriptures) seems to make it clear that that belief needs to take place in this life.  

On the other hand, we may be the types to be inclined to see scriptures like Matt. 25:31-46, Romans 1:20, or the many teachings on the boundlessness of God's grace and think that inclusivism is the correct view for a Christian to take.  If one is an inclusivist, then I find it hard to imagine that God wouldn't honor these sorts of prayers.  

Suppose, as Calvin thought, we humans are endowed with a sensus divinitatis - a sense of the divine - that allows us to be able to sense God in a way akin to our other senses.  Suppose further that, similar to sight or hearing, this sense may be damaged in a way to where it does not function properly.  The Christian narrative would say that this feature would be damaged as a result of the fall.  Perhaps those who have religious experiences have them because their sensus divinitatis is functional (or at least partly functional) while others' are less functional or entirely dysfunctional.  

It seems to me that it would be reasonable to think that agnostics of Draper's sort, who dedicate their lives to searching for the truth in these areas and who pray and seek a relationship with a deity they aren't sure exists, must not have properly functioning senses of the divine.  Is that their fault?  Hard to say.  But even if it is, isn't it possible (even probable) that God would honor that effort even in the absence of belief?  Further, what if the so-called "soul-making theodicy" is true (and I'm inclined to think that it is)?  What if God remains silent to some people as a means to developing good characteristics in those people's souls that would not have developed otherwise?  Draper, himself, admits to this possibility.  Possibly God uses his own silence to help some people build character.  To me it seems like quite the virtue to be willing to prepare oneself for a relationship with a being she isn't even sure exists purely on the possibility that that being does exists and is worthy of worship.  I, for one, would not be surprised at all if both (a) inclusivism is true, and (b) this variety of agnostic would be "included".

Lastly, I just want to say how pathetic I felt in reading someone like Draper talking about the fact that he prays to a God he doesn't believe in as a means to "cultivate or at least prepare for a relationship with God."  I'm a Christian who believes with certainty that God exists - how much more should I pray to cultivate my relationship with God?  But do I?  Honestly, probably not a whole lot more than Draper does (I have no idea how much he does, but I have a pretty good idea of how much I do, so I think this judgment is fair).  This, of course, is deplorable.  I don't know how many of my friends are in the same boat here, but I confess that I feel ashamed yet motivated to improve that area where my life is seriously lacking.

Bucket List

In recent years it has become increasingly clear to me that I need to make an official bucket list.  I find that I'm terrible at achieving goals - especially goals I never set.  Therefore I feel it is time to make these goals official.  There are a few qualities I want for my bucket list.  First, nothing too generic.  I don't want a bunch of stuff that generally everyone would put on their list if there is enough room.  It needs to be something specific to me.  Second, many items need to be fairly difficult to achieve.  There obviously will be a few simpler ones, since there are some relatively simple things that I really, really want to do.  But on the whole, I'd like to make a list of non-easy things that I really want to do.  Third, it all has to be at least possible.   Difficult, but possible.  Would I love to climb Everest?  Sure - but I can't.  I'm out of shape and sweat too much to be able to survive in that kind of cold.  Won't make the list.  With those general rules in mind, here are the first 15 things I can think of for my bucket list.  Notice these are not numbered.  No one thing will be given priority over another on the list, thus no numbering.

• Play a round of golf with a current or former U.S. President (I don't care about his or her political affiliation - it's about the office, not the occupant)
• Meet, get a picture taken with Alvin Plantinga
• Eat Oaxacan Black Mole cooked by Rick Bayless
• Go skydiving solo
• Go to a Lions game at Ford Field
• Go to a Super Bowl the Lions are playing in (obviously this is contingent on them making a Super Bowl during my lifetime at a time in which I can afford it)
• Have something I wrote published in a widely read publication
• Attend an annual meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers
• Get a hole in one in both regular golf and disc golf
• Visit 6 of the 7 continents (I hate cold too much to care about visiting Antarctica)
• Eat a Kobe steak in Kobe, Japan
• Play a round of golf on the Old Course at St. Andrews
• Compete against a professional athlete in the sport at which he or she is a professional
• Shoot a bull elk large enough that it makes sense to mount, and have it mounted
• Go on one legitimate, well-studied, well-planned, well-funded, extended treasure hunt

I'm sure there are a ton of things I've forgotten or just never thought of, but I think this is a good start.  Ideally I'd like my bucket list to get up to 25 items, so if any of you have any good ideas to add, please share!

On Conversions and Arguments for God's Existence

This is interesting.  I think I'll add her new blog to my very small and random blogroll.  Leah Libresco (right), a fairly popular atheist blogger, recently announced that she has decided to convert to Roman Catholicism.  From what I gather, a big factor in her conversion was the difficulty of believing in a real moral law without believing in a personal moral law giver.  She was influenced by the writings of C.S. Lewis and G.K. Chesterton...no surprise there.  Who isn't? 

Anyway, I found it interesting that it was the Moral Argument that was most persuasive to her.  My friend Luke Conway over at The Apologetic Professor started a series of posts rating the arguments for God's existence, but inexplicably left this one out (unless I'm missing one somewhere...if so, then sorry, Luke).  Our philosophy study group discussed the arguments for God's existence once upon a time and it seemed that most everyone considered this one good.  It gets me to thinking, though: what makes an argument for God's existence good, or even great?  Graham Oppy, an atheist philosopher of religion, recently said that a "successful" argument for God's existence is one that will persuade all reasonable theists, atheists, and agnostics who are willing to be objective and aren't prejudiced to their point of view.  To me this sounds ridiculous.  There's probably never been an argument for anything ever that would be "successful" by that definition.  As a Christian who believes humans operate with injured cognitive faculties due to the fall, I doubt it's even possible for such an argument to exist.  Generally speaking, I think that what makes an argument "successful" has to be consideration of the arguments persuasive success relative to other arguments for the same thing, or to arguments in the same field but for other things (so it would be possible to compare the success of the Kalam Cosmological Argument to that of the Evidential Argument from Evil, even though they argue for opposite things).  I'm open to suggestions for changing this notion, though.

My favorite one is the Ontological Argument.  I'm not sure it's the best, but it's my favorite.  Especially Plantinga's version.  It's just so simple it's downright elegant.  But I'm really starting to think that what makes an argument great is its persuasiveness to those not already prone to believing the conclusion.  I'm not sure I've ever heard of anyone coming to a belief in God based on the Ontological Argument or the Argument from Aesthetics, but the late Antony Flew went from atheist to deist based on the Teleological Argument, Ms. Libresco went to Catholicism based on the Moral Argument (as did C.S. Lewis in part, if I remember correctly...though not specifically Catholicism).  A guy I once knew was persuaded to become a Christian based on the Argument from Miracles (specifically the resurrection of Christ). 

The problem is that it could just be that the reason some arguments aren't successful isn't because they aren't good, but because most of those who hear the argument don't understand the argument.  This is almost certainly the case with the Ontological Argument - probably 99% of people who've only heard the argument once or twice have no idea the force of the argument or how it comes to the conclusion to which it aims.  This is definitely not the case with any of the design arguments or cosmological arguments or the Argument from Miracles.  I have a hard time thinking that complexity can be considered a flaw in an otherwise valid (and hopefully sound) argument.

Maybe there is a difference between a good argument and a successful argument.  There's no doubt that the Ontological Argument is a good argument - it's been the source of great discussion for just shy of a millennium.  But it's probably not very successful in that I doubt anyone has ever come to believe in God based on the argument.  I just doubt that success is the higher virtue between the two.  The famous math argument to prove that 1=2 comes to mind.  It's tricky, but anyone who knows math knows why it's wrong.  Nevertheless, it may prove to be successful in occasionally tricking those with little math skill (like myself) into thinking that math must be bunkum.  Is it a better type of argument purely because it enjoys occasional success?  I would say no.  It's better for an argument to be good (i.e. correct, valid, sound, etc.) than successful, even if the success of the argument must be sacrificed in order to make it good.

Anyway, now that that's been dealt with in an unsatisfactory manner, I'm just going to rank what I consider to be the top 5 arguments for God's existence...just the ones I like the most, not saying anything about their persuasiveness or success:

5. Anselm's Ontological Argument
4. Teleological Argument (design of the universe/anthropic principle)
3. Kalam Cosmological Argument
2. Moral Argument (sorry this is an outline, but Mavrodes' paper isn't available online)
1. Plantinga's Ontological Argument

Alvin Plantinga is my hero.

I'm pretty sure someone illegally transplanted text from Plantinga's "God, Freedom, and Evil" to get all that on the great interweb.  So Alvin, if you read this (yeah right), I'm sorry - it wasn't me, but I did have to link to it.  To close, I'll just explain my love for Plantinga's argument.  In short, if it's successful, then it proves God exists.  But the key is that even if it doesn't prove God's existence, it still puts the burden of proof squarely on the atheist.  According to the argument, if it is even logically possible for God to exist (if He exists in even one logically possible, but non-actual world), then it is logically necessary that He exists (in every logically possible world, thus necessarily including the actual world).  If sound, this would render probabilistic atheistic arguments like the Evidential Argument from Evil or the Argument from Divine Hiddenness moot, since they don't make claims about logical possibility.