Divine Hiddenness, Prayer, and Agnosticism

This week I was reading through a book I got for Christmas that I've been wanting to read for quite a while.  It's called "Divine Hiddenness: New Essays."  The problem of divine hiddenness, for those of you not familiar, is simply the question of why God, if he is who Christians say he is, hides from (some of) us.  While divine hiddenness is a very interesting topic, I don't really want to write a lot about divine hiddenness here.

I want to talk about Paul Draper's contribution to the book.  Paul Draper is one of the foremost agnostic philosophers of religion in the United States.  I'll give a really brief summary of his essay, then I'll give a few of my thoughts on the topic.  Draper, as I said, is an agnostic, which is to say he's not sure whether or not God exists.  He thinks there is quite a bit of evidence for both theism and naturalism (which entails atheism).  For those of you curious, here's a quick little list of features of our world that he sees as evidence for each:

Evidence for Theism	Evidence for Naturalism
The universe has a finite past	Earth is not the center of the universe
The existence of intelligent life	The universe is much older than humans
It appears we have free will	Life came about via evolution
It appears we have immaterial minds	Physical processes largely determine mental states
The world is full of beauty	Pain and pleasure are systematically connected to reproduction
Some people have religious experiences	The existence of tragedy in the world
	The distribution of religious experience is very uneven

Now, of course these lists aren't meant to be comprehensive, and I'm sure there are plenty of other things Draper would include if that were his goal, but it isn't.  His point is simply that there is a lot of, at least what seems on the face of it, evidence for both positions.  Further, he says that it's really quite impossible to look objectively at these things and know which evidence is stronger.  One can't simply assign number values for strength to each of the facts about the world, take whichever has the highest number, and believe it.  It's impossible to tell what those strength measurements would be.  So unless one has actually had those religious experiences, there's no good reason to sway one direction over the other.

Draper's conclusion is what I find truly interesting, precisely because it's as intellectually honest as they come.  Draper quotes H.H. Price's abbreviated version of the Agnostic's Prayer: "O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul."  I quote his conclusion at length.  He says:

“Since...I regard God's existence as a real possibility, I whole-heartedly agree with Price that it is reasonable – indeed, I would say rationally required – for me to behave differently than I would if I were an atheist. For example, I ought to pray – unlike the atheist I believe there just might be a God listening. More generally, I ought to do what I can to cultivate or at least prepare for a relationship with God.”

He goes on to say:

“Religious practice is very difficult for an agnostic, and for some there may be value in that difficulty. After all, human beings are psychologically very complex, to say the least. And it is well known that belief is not strongly correlated with sanctification. Thus, if theism is true, then I seriously doubt that the moral and spiritual development of every single human being is best served by belief in this life.”

He concludes with:

“I hope and even believe that my assessment is the result of an open mind rather than a closed or tender heart. But if this is so, then is the ambiguity of the evidence just an unfortunate coincidence? Or is it designed, not by me, but by a God whose policy is, 'Don't find me, I'll call you...when the time is right”? I don't know the answers to these questions. So for now I will sit on the fence, lost perhaps but still looking, leaning perhaps but not leaping, listening I hope, but not yet hearing.”

I have three things I want to discuss with regard to these comments.  One is directed to others who consider themselves agnostic along with Draper, one is directed to atheists, and one is directed to my fellow Christians.  

First, how should agnostics think about this issue?  Well, I can't see how an agnostic would get

around Draper's conclusion here.  Draper isn't sure exactly what probability to assign to God's existence, but he's pretty sure it's not zero.  If it isn't zero, it seems to me that a Pascalian decision calculus would come into play.  It's not exactly Pascal's Wager, since Draper isn't prescribing changes in beliefs or affirming a faith, but the reasoning is similar.  It's really just a piece of intellectual honesty.  Here's what really struck me: it seems like many agnostics use their agnosticism as an excuse to simply not have anything to do with religion.  I consider this variety of agnosticism intellectual laziness.  One presumably is an agnostic because she doubts both God's existence AND his non-existence.  So why do the vast majority of agnostics out there treat their agnosticism as license to act exclusively as if he doesn't exist?  Shouldn't one equally as often act as if she doubts that God does not exist, and thus act in a way similar to the one Draper describes (prayer, preparing for a possible relationship with God, etc.)?

So next is the question of whether or not any of this is relevant to atheists.  Here's my answer: so long as the atheist assigns a non-nil probability to God's existence, she should act in a similar way as Draper.  There are obviously quite a few atheists who do assign a zero probability to God's existence, and this shouldn't affect them at all.  But to give that sort of thing an absolute zero probability is a bit extreme and I'd guess probably fairly rare among atheists.  Here's the thing - if one grants that God's existence is logically possible then his existence is logically necessary.  On Christian theism, God is a necessarily existent being, which is to say that it isn't so much as possible that he not exist.  Another way to put this is to say that God exists is every possible world.  Plantinga's modified version of the ontological argument makes this point quite clearly:

If God's existence is possible, then he must exist in at least one possible world (even if it is not the actual world).  In any possible world in which he exists he is what he is - which is to say that he is a necessary being.  So in any possible world in which he exists it is necessarily false that God does not exist.  But necessary truths and falsehoods are true and false in all possible worlds (i.e. 2+2=4 in every possible world). It must, therefore, be necessarily false in every possible world (which includes the actual one) that God does not exist.  This, of course, means that it is necessarily false in our world that God does not exist, which means that it is necessarily true that God exists in our world.  

If you're an atheist, are you willing to assess a zero probability for God's existence?  If so...kudos - you're very bold.  If not, then shouldn't you at least be putting yourself in the shoes of the agnostic discussed above?

Finally, just what is the Christian to think about all this?  On the one hand, we know that "there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved." (Acts 4:12)  John 3 makes it pretty clear that (a) belief is necessary for salvation and (b) that belief must be placed in Christ.  The story of Lazarus the Beggar (and many other scriptures) seems to make it clear that that belief needs to take place in this life.  

On the other hand, we may be the types to be inclined to see scriptures like Matt. 25:31-46, Romans 1:20, or the many teachings on the boundlessness of God's grace and think that inclusivism is the correct view for a Christian to take.  If one is an inclusivist, then I find it hard to imagine that God wouldn't honor these sorts of prayers.  

Suppose, as Calvin thought, we humans are endowed with a sensus divinitatis - a sense of the divine - that allows us to be able to sense God in a way akin to our other senses.  Suppose further that, similar to sight or hearing, this sense may be damaged in a way to where it does not function properly.  The Christian narrative would say that this feature would be damaged as a result of the fall.  Perhaps those who have religious experiences have them because their sensus divinitatis is functional (or at least partly functional) while others' are less functional or entirely dysfunctional.  

It seems to me that it would be reasonable to think that agnostics of Draper's sort, who dedicate their lives to searching for the truth in these areas and who pray and seek a relationship with a deity they aren't sure exists, must not have properly functioning senses of the divine.  Is that their fault?  Hard to say.  But even if it is, isn't it possible (even probable) that God would honor that effort even in the absence of belief?  Further, what if the so-called "soul-making theodicy" is true (and I'm inclined to think that it is)?  What if God remains silent to some people as a means to developing good characteristics in those people's souls that would not have developed otherwise?  Draper, himself, admits to this possibility.  Possibly God uses his own silence to help some people build character.  To me it seems like quite the virtue to be willing to prepare oneself for a relationship with a being she isn't even sure exists purely on the possibility that that being does exists and is worthy of worship.  I, for one, would not be surprised at all if both (a) inclusivism is true, and (b) this variety of agnostic would be "included".

Lastly, I just want to say how pathetic I felt in reading someone like Draper talking about the fact that he prays to a God he doesn't believe in as a means to "cultivate or at least prepare for a relationship with God."  I'm a Christian who believes with certainty that God exists - how much more should I pray to cultivate my relationship with God?  But do I?  Honestly, probably not a whole lot more than Draper does (I have no idea how much he does, but I have a pretty good idea of how much I do, so I think this judgment is fair).  This, of course, is deplorable.  I don't know how many of my friends are in the same boat here, but I confess that I feel ashamed yet motivated to improve that area where my life is seriously lacking.

On Retroactive Impetratory Prayer

As I was driving today I began thinking again on a theological topic that has crossed my mind before, but that I've never actually put to much proper consideration.  When it comes to the problem of divine foreknowledge, I'm generally in the Molinist camp.  For those of you not familiar with what Molinism is, I recommend that you follow that little blue link prior to reading below.  Or you can just read on and try your best.  Or you can (as I suspect most people will choose to do) just stop reading.

Ok, so here is the question: If today I choose to pray that event E that happened yesterday would not have happened, (a) is it possible that God answer this prayer and (b) is it plausible that God would answer this prayer.  I'm calling this "Retroactive Impetratory Prayer" (hereafter, RIP).

I've come to the conclusion that (a) depends on which theological view to you hold to with regard to divine providence.  Let's start there.

Suppose I am an Open Theist approaching this question.  The Open Theist almost certainly has to answer in the negative.  On Open Theism, God does not have complete, definite foreknowledge.  He can be 99.999% certain of most things and even 100% certain of some things, but most things are probably in the "extremely well-informed guess" category rather than the "absolute certainty" category.  If this is the case, then there is no way that God could really justify answering a prayer that He doesn't know with absolute certainty will be prayed.  There's no way, then, that He actually would answer a prayer prior to its being prayed since it's still possible that the prayer won't be prayed.  This could change once all the necessary and sufficient conditions are met for a given prayer's being prayed.  Once that happens, I would think that answering the prayer prior to its instantiation would be fair game for God on Open Theism as well.

The Augustinian/Calvinist (A/C) (determinism or compatibilism, take your pick) view would also have to answer in the negative.  Strictly speaking, the past happened the way it did because God intentionally caused it to be that way in every case.  For God to answer a prayer prior to its being prayed, God would have to essentially admit that His plan was flawed to start with and then change it.  Of course, some of you A/C folks out there may disagree with my interpretation here, and if so I'd appreciate hearing about it.  One reason you may want to disagree is that this exact same reasoning can be used against the possibility of impetratory prayer of any kind on the A/C view, which is something I bet a lot of folks will want to avoid.  And, incidentally, this is yet another great reason not to hold the A/C view.  Just sayin'.

The Molinist, it seems to me, is the only one who can really entertain the possibility of RIP being able to work on any consistent basis.  First, on Molinism prayer definitely has the potential to impetrate.  That is, God's decisions in the world are definitely affected by prayer.  Second, God knows prior to the creation of the world exactly what prayers will be prayed at what time and by whom.  Third, it seems to me to be possible, if not probable, that God would be willing to take those future prayers into account when guiding events prior to the prayer.  So I think that the RIP issue is one that Molinists are (mostly) unique in having to address.  So there is my answer to (a).  (Brief aside: I'm not really sure if it's possible that a Molinist hold to a B-theory of time.  Haven't thought about it too much.  If one were to do so,  there may be some issues there as well...which I haven't bothered considering.  For now, though, I'm going to assume an A-theory of time and move on.) 

Now, if a Molinist answers affirmatively to (a), then what of (b)?  Well, I think first we need to recognize that on the Molinist account of prayer, God makes the decision of whether or not to answer a prayer prior to the creation of the world, so strictly speaking the time at which a prayer is prayed shouldn't affect His ability or willingness to answer it.  The problems really come when we conceptualize the prayer.  Say E happened yesterday and it displeased me.  Now let's say that I choose today to pray that E never happened.  Well, if I know I pray the prayer in the first place I already know that it went unanswered.  If there is but one timeline (and I think it's pretty reasonable to think this is the case, especially on the Christian worldview), it follows that events I have already experienced cannot be changed.  Those events would have never have been able to take place were my prayer answered retroactively (i.e. prior to my prayer having been prayed).  So, then, if I believe in the possibility of RIP, it follows that if I attempt a retroactive prayer I'm already guaranteed that the prayer was not answered.

But this is not the end of the issue!  Far from it.  No, no.  This is right where it gets interesting.  See, the mere fact that my praying for retroactive answers guarantees that those retroactive answers didn't happen does not mean that such prayers are completely superfluous!  God may actually answer some retroactive prayers, it's just that the believer who would have done the praying would never know it.  However, in order for there to be the possibility of such a prayer being prayed, the believer must actually get in the habit of praying such prayers.  Example:

Suppose there are two separate and unrelated events E1 & E2.  Believer B dislikes both and will pray that both did not happen in the past (these prayers will be P1 & P2, respectively).  God decides logically prior to creation whether or not he will answer either prayer.  Say God decides to answer P2 but not P1, so that E2 would not have happened, but E1 still would.  B would still have to have a mindset that may cause her to pray both P1 & P2 in order for P2 to be answered.  Likely, then, prayers of the P1 variety would still have to be prayed (even though B knows the prayers are superfluous) in order to guarantee that prayers of the P2 variety would also have been prayed (and thus not have taken place).  Otherwise there is no possibility that God know via middle knowledge that P2 would be prayed (since it would not, in fact, be prayed), and thus He would not prevent E2 from obtaining.

So the answer to (b) above would be: no. It is impossible that God answer the retroactive request you are currently praying for.  However, the Molinist can (and maybe even should) believe that such prayers may nevertheless be necessary in order for God to answer other retroactive prayers that she will never actually pray.

I really look forward to some thoughts on this from any of you theology dabblers out there!

**Update**

In a discussion I had on this last night with my roommate, I found that framing the issue in more explicitly Molinist terms was helpful.

Molinism, roughly, is the belief that God obtains His foreknowledge from the combination of three logical moments.  Moment 1: natural knowledge (knowledge of all necessary truths).  Moment 2: middle knowledge (knowledge of the truth value of all counterfactuals).  Next comes the decision to create the world.  Knowledge from moments 1 and 2 are then combined with the knowledge of which world was created, which gives God moment 3: Free knowledge (complete, definite foreknowledge of all circumstances that will obtain in the world and all free choices that will be made by creatures in those circumstances).

Consider the example I gave above in Molinist terms:

Prior to creation, God is presented with 2 counterfactuals:

C1. Given E1, B would freely choose P1.
C2. Given E2, B would freely choose P2.

Assuming both counterfactuals are true, God then weighs whether or not He plans to answer either P1 or P2 (or both) and chooses (still prior to creation) to answer P2, but not P1.

E2 now will never obtain.  B will only ever pray P1 and B will have no idea that E2 (and thus P2) was ever even a possibility.  B will certainly have no idea that God answered P2 without it ever happening.

However, the truth value of counterfactuals is determined by the free creature.  So, the truth values of both C1 and of C2 are in the hands of B.  It just so happens that God knows what B would choose given each circumstance.  So if B does not freely choose to pray retroactive prayers sometimes (already knowing that the prayer will not be answered), then it is a virtual guarantee that the truth values of both C1 and C2 would be false, causing God to not answer P2.